THE CASE FOR MULTIPARTY LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN GHANA
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Ghana is a constitutional democracy with a decentralized local governance system that has been in operation for almost three decades.

However, decentralization is largely administrative and the devolution of power and resources to Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) remains to be achieved. Currently, Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives (MMDCEs) and 30% MMDA members are appointed by the President as per the country’s constitution rather than being directly elected by the people through a competitive multiparty election. This is because Article 55 of the 1992 Constitution excludes political parties from local governance.

Local governance reforms have been part of the political and administrative history of Ghana since independence in 1957. Many of the local governance reforms in the past 30 years have not succeeded in transforming the existing system. Instead of devolving more power and resources, the reforms have largely led to recentralization rather than advance decentralization. A multiparty local governance system is what is required to halt the trend towards recentralization and devolve more power and resources to MMDAs. After extensive stakeholder consultations, President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo in his February 2018 State of the Nation Address, announced his government’s intent to amend Article 55 in order to allow political parties to participate in local governance. This will enable the election of MMDCEs and membership of MMDAs as well as sub-district structures on multiparty basis. As of now, political parties are constitutionally prohibited from participating in district elections.
2. Existing Local Governance system

Article 55(3) of the 1992 Constitution reads: “Subject to the provisions of this article, a political party is free to participate in shaping the political will of the people, to disseminate information on political ideas, social and economic programs of a national character, and sponsor candidates for elections to any public office other than to District Assemblies or lower local government units”. In essence, it prohibits political parties from participating in decentralized local governance.

First of all, this provision contradicts Article 35(6d) of the 1992 Constitution which reads: “The State shall take appropriate measures to ... make democracy a reality by decentralizing the administrative and financial machinery of government to the regions and districts and by affording all possible opportunities to the people to participate in decision making at every level in national life and in government”.

Worse still, the current system, has not led to meaningful development, high growth and accelerated industrialization of the economy although it has been in operation for almost 30 years.

The existing practice of decentralization in Ghana raises fundamental concerns about democracy at the lower level. It centralizes executive power and institutionalizes political exclusion. A multi-party based political system, at the national level is superimposed on a non-multi-party local governance system.

The capacity of the system to promote transformation and development of the local economy and to lift the majority of Ghanaians out of poverty in the next 30 years is in doubt.

Demand for transformational reform of the system has increased in the past 18 years but the requisite decisions have not been made and the threat of electoral violence to democratic stability and peace persists. Hence, the case for multi-party local governance system.
3. Proposed New Local Governance System

Under the new system, competitive multiparty politics will be introduced into decentralized local governance. This will enable all political parties have access to the executive arm of government where they will gain experience in local democracy and nation building.

Making the position of MMDCEs and membership of MMDAs elective through the amendment of Article 55 would boost the quest for democratic devolution in Ghana. Specifically, it will lead to more power and resources being devolved to the MMDAs, promote inclusion through opening up of the executive arm of government to all political parties, promote effective and inclusive local economic development, deepen democracy and promote greater accountability.

For the first time, political parties will take part in decentralized local governance and MMDCEs and membership of the MMDAs and the sub-district structures will be elected directly by the people. The cessation of the President appointing all MMDCEs and 30 per cent of membership of MMDAs will promote inclusiveness as other parties will vie for these positions. The country will experience much less of the cyclical electoral fears and threats of violence.

There will be a change in the dynamics of local politics as alliances and coalitions will be built by parties if they do not win the majority of the votes to enable them govern in the MMDAs. There will be more emphasis on effective delivery and a positive effect on local development. Holding direct multiparty elections at the local level will involve the process of amending some sections of the Constitution (both entrenched and non-entrenched) to be followed by legal, institutional, financial and capacity reforms.

The introduction of competitive multiparty elections at the district level will enhance the degree of popular control over officials of the MMDAs. This will in turn promote the downward accountability of MMDAs and thereby lead to a more responsive form of governance.

In the public discussion on the subject, the election of MMDCEs on party lines has become the primary justification for amending Article 55(3) – the key subsection of Article 55 on the exclusion of political parties from decentralized local governance.

This is too limited a view as there is a more fundamental reason for amending Article 55(3). In his inaugural address of 2017 as well as in speeches delivered earlier in 2015 in his capacity as Presidential
candidate, the President cited more fundamental and compelling reasons for his decision to amend Article 55 of the 1992 Constitution. His first reason was the imperative to devolve more power and resources to the regions, districts and communities in order to accelerate local economic and social development and vigorously tackle poverty and eradicate widespread poverty in the rural areas.

The second was his conviction that the relative stability of the Fourth Republic establishes a stronger basis for extending multiparty politics to the sphere of local governance. To him, therefore, it was now time to establish a multiparty local governance regime well aligned to the democratic governance system at the national level. The third was that it will deepen democracy and promote greater accountability.

Because Article 55 is an entrenched clause, any amendments to it require the holding of a national referendum as well as a Bill passed by Parliament. Because the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP), does not have the required two-thirds majority in the 275-member Parliament (it holds 169 (61%) seats as against the National Democratic Congress’ (NDC) 106 (39%), any amendment needs the support of the minority party (NDC) in particular. To achieve this, there may be the need to go beyond Article 55 and amend other complementary sections of the constitution that the main opposition considers necessary. Therefore, the entirety of Parliament will need to be prepared to perform its constitutional role.

The role of Parliament in amending an entrenched provision of the Constitution has been the subject of debate and some political parties registered their intention to file a writ at the Supreme Court for an interpretation of Article 290, which deals with the amendment of entrenched provisions.

A successful amendment of Article 55(3) (which is an entrenched provision and therefore requires an elaborate amendment process as provided in Article 290) would enable political parties to participate in the election of MMDCEs in the near future. However, an unresolved disagreement over the role of the Parliament vis-à-vis the Executive in the amendment procedure could seriously jeopardize the required constitutional amendment referendum to be held jointly with the next district level elections (DLEs) planned for September 2019. In contention is whether
or not Parliament has a meaningful or cosmetic role in relation to the Executive in the
determination of the subject matter for the amendment of an entrenched constitution.
Earlier in 2014, this disagreement halted the process of amending the entrenched
provisions of the Constitution proposed by the Constitutional Review Commission (CRC).

Since this disagreement persists, a judicial interpretation may be pursued by political
opponents in the Supreme Court. The process of judicial interpretation in the second
half of 2018 may not fit within the time schedules of the Article 290 procedures. The
opportunity to meet those timelines early enough for the national referendum to be held
by September 2019 could be missed should Parliament and the Executive fail to agree
on the Constitutional Amendment Bill by the end of December 2018 for Gazetting by
February 2019.

Resorting to judicial determination will
not be necessary if the two major political
parties undertake to work together on the
Amendment Bill. This option will require
significant effort from them. A Bill agreed
upon by Parliament could be forwarded
to the Executive for the Attorney-General
to formalize and for the Cabinet to
consider and approve. Consensus between
Parliament and the Cabinet on the
framing of the Constitutional Amendment
Bill would resolve the ambiguity over
the role of Parliament in seeking
public approval of the Bill in a national
referendum.

A bipartisan approach to the Amendment
of Article 55(3) in Parliament would
inevitably result in a Cabinet-Parliament
collaboration to steer the amendment
process through Parliament and the
national referendum. Such a collaboration
is preferred to the option of judicial
interpretation because it will eliminate
any partisan rivalry over the ownership
of the Bill and the whole process. The
bipartisan option would also have the
added advantage of arriving at consensus at the national referendum even among political party supporters and make possible the eventual amendment.

Additionally, the bipartisan approach eliminates the danger of a prolonged harangue which could be the consequence of going for judicial interpretation. The challenge however, is how to secure bipartisan support in Parliament.

Some Potential Risks

There are a number of risks to successfully amending Article 55. They are as follows:

i. Not achieving a bipartisan consensus that enables political parties to take part in both the district level elections (DLEs) and the referendum to be held together in 2019. This risk can be substantially reduced through public education and an appeal to the political parties to follow the constitutional provision.

ii. Low voter turnout given the constitutional requirement for 40 percent turn out and 75 percent approval. This calls for more coordinated public education campaigns and the mobilisation of strong public support for a high turnout for the referendum.

iii. Like all referenda, the 2019 referendum is likely to sharply divide the electorate into those for and those against, thus further polarizing the country. To prevent this divide from degenerating into electoral tension and violence, all political parties especially the NPP and NDC will be required to conduct their campaigns in a peaceful and tolerant manner.

iv. Inadequate and delayed funding of the elections. To avoid this occurring in 2019, government should ensure timely and adequate financing of the Electoral Commission (EC) to enable it to conduct efficient and credible DLEs and the national referendum jointly.

v. The additional cost to the political parties as they will now have to sponsor each candidate separately and not on a common platform mounted for all the candidates by the Electoral Commission (EC) as is currently done, even though it is an open secret that they are sponsored by political parties.

vi. The capacity of the EC to hold the elections within the same week, given the large number of electoral areas in district elections.

vii. The process of constitutional amendment is time consuming and maybe subject to delays especially when there are legal challenges. A feasible and agreed timeline is therefore needed which will also require buy-in from all the stakeholders especially elite consensus as resistance in any reform must be anticipated and prepared for.
5. Implication of the successful “YES” vote in the referendum

If the amendment is approved, the following can be expected:

i. Elected MMDA and MMDCE Officials: The election of 256 MMDCEs and membership of MMDAs through direct, open and competitive party-based elections. The result could mean the distribution and re-distribution of the 256 MMDAs among different political parties, giving them a share in executive power.

ii. Elected Assembly members with some Mixed Member Proportional Representation: It will mean that 70 percent of Assembly members are elected based on the first-past-the-post and the remaining 30 percent based on proportional representation under which political parties will select candidates (women, youth, people with disability and ethnic minorities) on their strength.

iii. It could also result in the setting up of seven-member Local Development Advisory Councils (LDAC) by law to provide advice to the MMDAs: Out of the seven members, four will be chiefs nominated by traditional councils, at least two will be queen mothers also nominated by the traditional councils and the remaining three will represent professional groups to be selected on a rotational basis.
iv. Strengthened Regional Coordinating Councils (RCCs):
The new system will result in strengthened RCCs because of the reforms and additional resources that come with it for improved monitoring and evaluation. This is important as the RCCs become the link between the President and party based elected MMDCEs and MMDAs. Even though some have argued that the Regional Ministers should also be elected, democracies usually have a combination of elected and appointed officials. Accordingly, the Regional Ministers will continue to be appointed by the President.

V. Deepened Fiscal decentralization:
It should deepen fiscal decentralization through an increase in the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) from the current 5% to up to 22.5%. Once the political parties get involved in local politics, there is the likelihood of the DACF being increased and pressure being brought on the central government to release timely and fully disbursements from the DACF. The multiplier effect of the reform will be felt even if it is not immediate as a “small change with a big impact” will undoubtedly take some time for its objectives to be fully realized. This is one of the major lessons of any reform which the literature has forcefully reinforced.

vi. Development Oriented Political Parties: With several political parties now in government, albeit local, their developmental governance capacity will be strengthened to enable them be effective in local development as this would be the first time they would play such a role in the Fourth Republic.

vii. Effective and Efficient Public Service Institutions: Effective and efficient public service institutions are important to any public sector reform. Accordingly, inter-sectoral and inter-agency collaboration and coordination are needed to reduce overlaps and duplication. In addition, targeted capacity development assessment needs and interventions will be required for some of the institutions.

viii. Strengthened Sub-district Structures: The sub-district structures vary according to the categorization of Assemblies. For instance, Metropolitan Assemblies have SMDCs and Town Councils (TCs) as their sub-district structures, while the Municipal Assemblies have Zonal Councils (ZCs) and District Assemblies have Urban/Town and Area Councils (UTACs).

The Unit Committees (UCs) form the lowest layer of the sub-district structures for the three categories of districts. They lack the human and material resources to promote development. There is general public apathy and despondency. Others have argued that the sub-district structures have been rendered ineffective by the
Potential and Multiple Positive Effects of the Amendment of Article 55, 1992 Constitution:

1. Enhanced Democratic stability, peace, justice and security
2. Strong political parties and electoral and developmental governance
3. Higher growth, increasing tax revenue, equitable wealth redistribution (central & local)
4. Effective institutions, less corruption, improved public service delivery
5. Stronger delivery of Chapter Six (DPSP), 1992 Constitution, objectives
6. Rule of law, accountability & Justice stronger at all levels
7. More effective parliamentary, oversight representation & law making

Amendment of Art. 55
Multiparty Local Governance (MMDCEs, MMDAs)
Democratic Devolution
More executive power and resources devolved to districts

Note: These positive and multiple results are negative in the current local government system.

proliferation of NGOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) which perform similar functions. Even though IDEG’s position is that the sub-district structures are relevant, they are currently “non-functional or dysfunctional” and should therefore be strengthened to be more functional and effective. This can be done by operationalizing LI 1967 of 2010, which has “resolved many of the technical problems associated with LI 1589 of 1994” and the preparation of a road map to operationalize the sub-district structures.
The debate for and against the amendment of Article 55(3) is likely to continue after the referendum in 2019 because there will be winners and losers in any reform on power redistribution. In spite of this, it is the belief of IDEG that Ghana will be the eventual winner if a positive outcome of the referendum is achieved through a “Yes” Vote. In this connection, all energies must be garnered for a coordinated and vigorous public education programme for the mobilization of popular support that will secure the needed turn out and votes.

All the stakeholders including public sector institutions such as the Council of State, Executive, Parliament, Judiciary, Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) and MMDAs as well as citizens, political parties, traditional authorities, civil society organizations and the media must be prepared to contribute their quota in what will turn out to be a major transformational reform exercise.

The amendment of Article 55(3) is the most important amendment of the 1992 Constitution needed to address the structural cracks in the multiparty and developmental governance architecture of the Fourth Republic. This amendment will remove the constitutional prohibition against political parties’ participation in district level elections and decentralized local governance. It will alter the power relations between the central and MMDAs and bring to an end the exclusionary and divisive winner-takes-all practices that had weakened public institutions, integrity and accountability in public office and undermined the rule of law.

An amended Article 55(3) has more potential than any other Article in the Constitution to unleash a one-stop governance reform with constructive domino-effects on the entire regime of democratic governance and transformational development in the country. It will have far-reaching ramifications for democracy and development in Ghana.
7. “Frequently Asked Questions and Answers” on the Participation of Political Parties in Ghana’s Local Governance Compiled from IDEG’s Activities

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<tr>
<th>QUESTIONS</th>
<th>ANSWERS</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Why should political parties participate in local decentralized governance?</td>
<td>Their participation would promote inclusiveness and reduce the winner-takes-all system and polarization. It will also enable the minority political parties to control some MMDAs and therefore give them a share in executive power at the local level even as the ruling party controls power at the national level.</td>
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<td>2. Will the election of MMDCEs and Assembly members on multi-party lines improve the quality of political leadership at the local level?</td>
<td>The quality of MMDCEs and Assembly members would improve because the political parties with their own internal vetting and competitive processes will scrutinize and bring out their best candidates for election as they compete among themselves.</td>
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<td>3. What will be the relationship between the President and MMDCEs who do not belong to his party?</td>
<td>The President and MMDCEs who do not belong to his party would be working for development and would therefore need each other in order to fulfill their mandates and promises and get re-elected. The President, for instance, would be required by law to release funds to the districts irrespective of the party affiliation of the MMDCEs. Similarly, the MMDCEs seeking re-election will see to the implementation of central government policies and programmes in their MMDAs.</td>
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<td>4. Why should the current system be changed?</td>
<td>The system has been tried for about 30 years with several challenges. In reality, political parties secretly sponsor candidates for the district level elections (DLEs) anyway, and therefore it is better to open up the system for the participation of the political parties rather than continue with the pretension or hypocrisy of non party based local government.</td>
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5. Would the participation of political parties at the local level divide a multi-ethnic district?

Not at all. IDEG’s proposal for the implementation of the Mixed Member Proportional Representation (MMPR) would ensure that marginalized groups such as women, the youth, people with disabilities and ethnic minorities are well represented at the district.

6. How would the activities of the political parties be regulated to prevent their divisive tendencies at the local level?

Given the recent trend of two dominant political parties in Ghana, there is a need to strengthen the capacity of the smaller parties to compete and win power at the local level. This is to prevent further polarization at the local level. IDEG has been holding a series of workshops and seminars to help develop the capacity of the smaller parties. In addition, the setting up of a Multi-Party Democracy Commission will improve the regulation of political parties which the Electoral Commission is currently unable to do.

7. How would the participation of political parties in local governance ensure the removal of a non-performing MMDCE?

A non-performing MMDCE would lose future elections. He/she can also be removed by the mechanism of recall in the Local Governance Act, Act 936 of 2016. In addition, non-performance of an MMDCE will be greatly reduced as the political parties acting as “sieves” in their internal processes will select qualified and experienced candidates to put up for the DLEs.

8. What will be the relationship between the Regional Minister – a presidential appointee- and an all elected Assembly?

The President will need a representative in the region to coordinate and monitor activities of MMDCEs. This will be the role of the Regional Minister. Ghana is a unitary country and therefore the appointment of a Regional Minister will be in keeping with its status. In addition, democratic governance is about elected and appointed officials who perform complementary roles.

9. How prepared is the Electoral Commission to oversee the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections together with DLEs on the same day?

The EC needs to be strengthened through a structural reform to take up this additional role. The setting up of a Multi-Party Democracy Commission will hive off some of the regulatory functions of the EC to enable it concentrate more on electoral issues.

10. How much will it cost the country to elect MMDCEs on multi-party politics?

Elections are expensive. Political parties will incur additional costs. However, the costs could be reduced if the election of MMDCEs and Assembly members is held the same day as the Presidential and Parliamentary elections. This will help reduce voter fatigue, tension and save cost and time.
Evolution of the clamour for governance reforms leading up to the President’s decision

The decision to include political parties in decentralized local governance has been a slow and incremental one. As far back as the year 2000, the NPP in the lead up to the elections made it clear in its election manifesto that in the event of capturing power, it would ensure that MMDCEs were directly elected. However, at the end of its first four-year term as the governing party, this pledge to have MMDCEs elected, remained undelivered. It therefore came as no surprise when the authors of the APRM Report on Ghana (2005), included the urgent need to have MMDCEs directly elected by the people in their governance recommendations. The argument for
electing MMDCEs has been on the table for almost two decades and the discussions on the subject have evolved over the years.

At various points in time even proponents of the argument have held contradictory positions. For example, former President, J.A. Kufuor in an address read on his behalf at the inauguration of the various Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) on September 16, 2002, noted that the concept of non-party elections at the local level is a charade: “From comments made by various people, it seems that non-partisan elections constitute a huge exercise in self-deception ... since it appears the political parties sponsor candidates unofficially and I believe it is time we made it official” (Daily Graphic September 17, 2002:1).

This position is in contrast to that espoused in 2008, in which President Kufuor cautioned against rushing into electing MMDCEs, arguing that the idea has the potential of being counterproductive. In his view, “the current system of appointing MMDCEs should be allowed to mature to the days when the nation could confidently adopt the new idea.” Even though the idea to elect MMDCEs has a “great appeal its rushed implementation can become counterproductive at the current level of development of the country when national unity, security and the fair distribution of the national cake must be central in governance”.

In 2008, the new NDC administration, led by President John Mills set up a Constitution Review Commission (CRC) to advise on the matter. Its 2011 report recommended the following:

i. Parliament should be empowered to amend Article 248 at any time in the future to make provision for partisan elections at the district and sub-district levels.

ii. Parliament should be empowered to determine specific mechanisms for choosing MMDCEs, which should vary according to whether it is a Metropolis, a Municipality or a District. In Metropolitan areas, Mayors should be popularly elected.

iii. In Municipalities, three nominees of the President who have been vetted by the Public Service Commission would contest in a public election.

iv. In District Assemblies, the President should nominate a candidate for approval by a simple majority of the Assembly as DCE.
A cursory look at the recommendations, show that the CRC was operating from a perspective that drew a distinction between the election of MMDCEs and the election of membership of MMDA. While MMDCEs were to be elected without political party activity, Assembly Members and members of the lower units were to be elected through a multi-party political contest. The CRC’s separation of the election of MMDCEs from election of membership of MMDA has continued to exert significant influence on the discussion on the subject to this day.

The Government did not accept the CRC’s recommendations. It rejected the CRC recommendations on the election of Assemblymen on the grounds that “the arguments advanced by the Commission for a non-partisan local government system far outweigh any arguments in favor of a partisan local government system. Government therefore intends that Article 248 in its present form be retained”.

Similarly, the recommendations on the method of selecting MMDCEs was also rejected because in “decentralizing in a unitary state, a delicate balance ought to be struck between central control and local autonomy. Consequently, Government is of the view that Article 243 (1) of the Constitution should be amended for the President to nominate a minimum of five persons who should be vetted by the Public Services Commission for competence after which three nominees would contest in a public election”.

The Presidential and Parliamentary elections of 2012 temporarily took the issue of direct popular election of MMDCEs off the political agenda. The NPP Presidential candidate had pledged during the Presidential debate to have MMDCEs elected by the people if he came to power. His defeat in the election followed by an eight month long Supreme Court adjudication meant that the election of MMDCEs dropped out political discourse until the 2016 elections renewed voters’ interest in the subject. Two main developments accounted for the revival of interest in MMDCE elections.

Firstly, almost all the parties pledged some form of election of MMDCEs in their manifestos. Secondly, the 2015 NCCE survey on issues of interest to the public pointed out that about 70 percent of voters were in favor of the direct popular election of MMDCEs. Interestingly, however, neither the party manifestoes
nor the NCCE survey raised the role of political parties in the election of MMDCEs.

By 2016, the issue had evolved further and the NPP in its 2016 election manifesto, pledged to have MMDCEs elected within 24 months.

In February 2018, the president in his state of the nation address said the following: “yet another ambitious decentralisation exercise is the expansion of full democracy to local government. A critical step, to this end, is the direct election of Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives on a partisan basis. It is a firm manifesto commitment of the New Patriotic Party. Further, my discussions with the nation’s political leaders, including the former Presidents of the Republic, convince me that it is a step we must take. The constitutional impediment to this, in Article 55 of the Constitution, an entrenched clause, must, therefore, be removed. To ensure the judicious use of the country’s resources, I propose that the constitutional processes for a Referendum should be initiated in such a manner that the holding of the Referendum will take place at the same time as next year’s District Assembly elections. If successful, the outcome of the Referendum will mean that the current set of MMDCEs will be the last batch of Chief Executives to be appointed under the current system. I have no doubt that the resourceful Minister for Local Government and Rural Development, Hajia Alima Mahama, MP for Nalerigu Gambaga, will be able to shepherd this process to a positive conclusion.”

The Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG) is an independent, impartial, not-for-profit, policy research and advocacy institute established in January 2000. The institute functions as a centre of excellence, cutting-edge policy research and analysis, interface capacity development, and results-driven advocacy aimed at strengthening democratic and transformational developmental governance in Ghana and Africa. Working mainly through policy research, dialogue, institutional relations, advocacy and training, the IDEG’s operations are organised into five thematic programme-areas. These are: (a) ‘Electoral Politics, Developmental Political Parties and Accountability’, (b) ‘Public Service Institutions and Local Governance Reforms’, (c) ‘Poverty, Inequality and Sustainable Development’, (d) ‘Citizens Education and Community Action’, and (e) ‘Pan-African Integration and Global Relations Programmes’.

In the past 18 years the IDEG has evolved as a leading civil society think-tank with a forte in critical political and social analysis, transformative governance reform advocacy, interface capacity building and high-level policy engagements. Its’ thought leadership, promotion of innovative and inclusive international development cooperation, electoral peace pacts, civil society elections’ coordination through ‘situation rooms’ and interventions to strengthen participatory and accountable governance have been highly commended. The introduction of a multiparty local governance system is a major component of the IDEG’s transformational governance reform advocacy.

(i) 2010-2012: The IDEG critique of the winner-takes-all regime and engagement of the Constitution Review Commission (CRC) for a more inclusive regime through the participation of political parties in local governance;

(ii) 2013: The IDEG in collaboration with the Civic Forum Initiative (CFI) and the National Peace Council (NPC) embarked on consultations on
multiparty local governance reform with the leaders of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and New Patriotic Party (NPP); also engaged the Constitution Review Implementation Committee (CRIC) on the subject matter. Later a public disagreement on the matter occurred.

(iii) 2014: The IDEG, the Civic Forum Initiative (CFI) and allied Civil Society Organizations launched a national dialogue on multiparty local governance, involving the amendment of Article 55(3) of the 1992 Constitution. The IDEG also presented its tripod democratic devolution reforms, which is consequential to the amendment of Article 55(3) to the public.

(iv) 2015: The IDEG focused on mobilizing financial resources to boost the implementation of its public outreach and education activities and also build broad-based elite-consensus to support the amendment of Article 55(3) either as an addition to the 41 entrenched articles proposed for amendment by the CRIC or as a stand-alone amendment. An NCCE opinion survey report (August 2015) showed that over 69 percent of the respondents supported the idea of electing MMDCEs but not necessarily on political party basis. It was also the view of the majority of the respondents that the dominant political parties were informally sponsoring candidates in District elections despite the prohibition in Article 55(3).

(v) 2016: The IDEG held regional dialogues on democratic devolution at the peak of 2016 presidential and parliamentary elections’ campaigns. The majority of the political parties that contested the 2016 presidential and parliamentary elections endorsed the idea of electing MMDCEs in their manifestos and committed themselves to implement it once elected. The NPP explicitly committed itself to elect MMDCE within 24 months in government.

(vi) 2017: President Nana Addo-Dankwa Akufo Addo, in his inaugural speech in January 2017, initiated his agenda for far-reaching decentralization and local governance reforms in the country. This involved the creation of new regions, the devolution of more Executive power and resources to advance local economic development and allowing political parties to participate in district elections.

(vii) 2018: The President directed, in his Message on the State of the Nation to Parliament in February, the amendment of Article 55 of the 1992 Constitution through a joint national referendum and district elections in 2019. The IDEG has actively supported the implementation of the President’s decisions on the reform of the country’s decentralization and local government system since he assumed office in 2017.
Rt. Hon. Prof. Aaron Mike Oquaye, Speaker of Parliament delivering his keynote address at the IDEG’s National Civil Society Organization forum on June 27, 2018

GACC - CSOs first meeting with the President, Nana Addo-Danquah Akufo Addo on April 10, 2017

Group photograph of participants at the National Civil Society Forum on June 27, 2018
Mr. O. B. Amoah, Hon. MP and Deputy Minister for Local Government and Rural Development and Other Participants.

Mr. Dan Botwe, Hon. MP and Minister for Regional Reorganization and Development; Alhajia Alima Mahama, Hon. MP and Minister for Local Government and Rural Development; Prof. Kofi Quarshigah, Constitutional Law Expert and Dean, University of Ghana Law School, Legon

Prof. Joseph A. Ayee, Local Government Expert and Senior Research Fellow, IDEG; Mr. Kwasi Boateng Adjei, Hon. MP and Deputy Minister for Local Government and Rural Development; Dr. Nana Ato Arthur, The Head of Local Government Service.

Mr. O. B. Amoah, Hon. MP and Deputy Minister for Local Government and Rural Development and Other Participants.

Mrs. Bridget Katsrku, Chairman of the public services commission.
IDEG CONSULTATIONS WITH POLITICAL PARTIES ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLE 55(3), 1992 CONSTITUTION

Mr. Samuel Ofosu-Ampofo, Former MP and Minister for Local Governance, leader of the NDC delegation to the seminar.

Mr. Bede Zedieng and other members of the NDC delegation

Group photo of representatives of Minority Political Parties at a workshop at IDEG in June, 2016.